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In China’s Vanguard Civilization: Is there Shelter for the Third World?
Tseggai Isaac
Abstract
This paper looks at China’s civilizational and modernization heritages. Its ancient
civilization is described as the first phase of China’s civilization. In the first phase,
China’s Civilization was stellar, and creative, possessing well–structured bureaucratic
institutions with phenomenal capacities for artistic production and the advancement of
high sciences. The second phase of China’s civilization reflects its current
modernization, one inspired and operationalized by Marxism and Maoism. The earlier
phase of China’s Civilization was aloof, benign, self-sufficient, reticent and reluctant
to attract untoward global attention. This ancient civilization, rooted in the organic soil
of China itself, was holistic, robust on its own merit.
China's civilization was inspired by its ancient religions and social formations. From
such fountainheads, China’s institutional framework at the village, community, district,
and regional levels responded to bureaucratic authority to produce creative and
organically legitimate governance for centuries.
The ancient civilization of China represented a multidimensional grandeur. At its
height, it combined scientific rationalizations with productive outputs in material
science. There was a seamless integration of ancient technical and scientific
differentiation. These were ancient, but their scientific characteristics were rather
modern. If we average and standardize variation to account for epochal setbacks and
institutional aberrations, such as misguided actions by the emperors, it is not farfetched
to say that the level of scientific maturity that Great Britain reached in its industrial
revolution by the 16th and 17th centuries matched China’s scientific output of two
thousand years before.
China’s scientific output in ancient days represented functionally relevant and
exquisitely adaptive features in their effects and utility. Pre-modern China showed to
the world mastery of the hard sciences. Its engineering excellence testified to China’s
mastery of metallurgy, chemical sciences, physics, astronomy, medicine, and structural
engineering. Its socio-cultural development were the foundations of ancient China’s
highly matured political development. Political maturity of ancient China valued
human freedom with hierarchical order, revealing one of the oldest and most creative
civilizations in the world.
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China’s coming status as a superpower is unmistakable. As China’s superpower status
consolidates in the next few decades, Third World states are asking, naturally: “Is China
going to introduce celebratory developmental alternatives to the neocolonial structures
of the West?”
Introduction
The content of a nation's history is the foundation of its civilization. China’s history
and civilization reveal the country as having the oldest continuous state system, one
infused with a rich civilization. Historians, anthropologists, sociologists, and political
scientists attempt to unfold the nearly boundless tapestry of China’s rich civilization
and come to the common conclusion affirming that the State of China prevailed for
millennia.
The enduring survivability of China is reflected in its cultural, traditional and religious
heritage. Irrespective of the numerous dynasties of ancient China, the creative and
productive emperors of the medieval years, or the struggling rulers on the eve of
European colonialism, the State of China kept the lights shining on its legitimacy.
China’s status of a superpower was predicted as early as the 1890s.
More than a century ago, James Whitford Bashford noted China’s status as a global
power. He stated:
In the problems of the twentieth century, the United States and China bulk large —
the United States because of her long line of sea coast on the Pacific, her high
industrial and commercial development, her enormous wealth, her energy, and the
inevitable increase of her population along the Pacific Coast. The completion of
the Panama Canal will put the entire United States, including the Atlantic Coast,
three thousand miles nearer China than is Europe. The Christian faith, which we
very imperfectly represent, may nevertheless through us become dominant in the
Pacific Basin.
China bulks large because she now has a population of 437,000,000 — threefourths the people of the Pacific basin — whose industry, energy, economy,
perseverance and fruitfulness make the Anglo-Saxon of the Orient. China sustains
this immense population wholly by farming and such crude manufacturing as can
be carried on by hand. China is just beginning to accept modern inventions and to
introduce modern machinery; and with far the largest and toughest, most
industrious and most economical laboring class on our globe, an era of vast
industrial expansion is immediately before her.
Moreover, China is now beginning to construct railroads and to open the largest
and finest coal and iron mines thus far known to man.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol80/iss80/6
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Baron Richthofen, after a laborious investigation of many years, submitted to the
German government a three-volume report of the coal and iron resources of China,
showing that they are the finest in the world. He found coal in fifteen of the
eighteen provinces examined by him; and in the province of Shansi alone he
reported enough coal to supply the human race for several thousand years. Side by
side with these supplies of coal, Baron Richthofen found vast supplies of iron ore.
The German government was so amazed by Baron’s report that an expert
commission was sent to China in 1897 to reexamine his data, and this commission
fully verified Baron Richthofen’s estimates. It was the discovery of these
marvelous resources of China which led to the greedy attempts of European powers
to divide the empire — attempts which led to the Boxer uprising and which were
frustrated largely by the statesmanship of Secretary Hay and the power of the
United States. Surely, a population of 437,000,000 in a compact territory sustained
by agriculture alone is a phenomenon unmatched by any other country on our
globe.1
The lengthy quote above is a proper context for looking at China’s climb to the status
of a superpower. It shows that the essential elements of national power were available
in abundance for China to marshal those elements of power and embolden itself to
defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
This paper begins by looking at China’s timeless civilization, its capabilities, and its
potentials to defend itself from external aggression. Yet, as China prepares to assume
a superpower status, its relationship to the Third World is facing criticism as being
exploitative and damaging. We should look at this argument and examine if the links
of ideology, national interest, and lack of skills in public policy are primary causes for
any foreign aid irrespective of the status of “communist” China or the “liberal” West.
China’s Timeless Civilization
The Chinese civilization commands unparalleled greatness among world civilizations.
Other civilizations have left little of material use that can be said to have value in the
21st century. Chinese civilization boasts of the continuity and utility of its civilizational
outcomes. China had the technical and strategic capabilities to embark on colonial
ventures before European nations initiated their colonial ambitions. What China lacked
at the time of European colonial expansion was simply the ambition to compete with
Western Imperialism.

1

Bashford, J. A (1907). The Awakening of China. The Board of Foreign Missions of the Methodist
Episcopal Church, China Sentential Commission, New York, NY: pp. 2-3.
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National ambition as a motivating factor for greatness is exemplified by the fact that
the great Chinese civilization that had accumulated vast technical, scientific, and legal
traditions failed in the nineteenth century to capitalize on those resources to prevent
China’s defeat and occupation by the European powers.2
The Chinese — whose mastery of medicine, technology, explosives, magnets, and
seafaring technology was incomparable from the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries —
are now measuring their current economic boom against their past ambivalence for
imperial expansion. They see virtue in the pacifism and disinterest of their ancestors,
in their refraining from spearheading colonial ventures before the Europeans. China’s
emerging projection of power appears designed not to repeat past ambivalence, but
rather to meet any Western challenge on Chinese terms at any cost.
Unless the current totalitarian political system destroys the social system and leads to
national decay, the prospect of China emerging as a superpower of undisputed
supremacy is ineluctable.
The Chinese were oriented to think inward in terms of their perceived cultural
superiority. They felt invincible and as a result neglected the need for vigilance. Selfcontentedness at the highest level resulted in forgetting the call to develop and maintain
the essential elements of national power. They could not overcome their inner thoughts
and cultural practices to initiate aggression as a pretext for taking the lands of other
societies. The closing decades of the 19th century were painful ones for China, because
it could not mount any resistance against foreign occupation. Events such as the Boxer
Rebellion represent symbolic indicators of China’s indomitable spirit.
China slept for thousands of years and awoke to find itself embattled and ransacked
by foreign powers.3
The ancient Chinese technical and scientific creativity flowed from cultural norms that
permeated Chinese society, enabling them to solve immediate and local problems
(Mott, F. W. 2003). The Chinese of the middle ages were innovative in the technical
realms, but they lacked ambition and vision to channel their technical innovations for
imperial conquest. They were ambivalent as to the benefits that could be extracted by
marrying their scientific creativity with the contrivances of diplomacy, political
ambitions, thirst for adventure and risk taking.

2

Bailey, Thomas A. The Foreign Policy of the American People, Prentice-Hall, New York, NY: 1982.
Bailey is full of accolades and, at the same time, he is a dispassionate critic of American greatness. His
analysis is beneficial in looking at the pitfalls of uncouth diplomacy and the fortifying strengths of the
military-industrial complex aptly defined by President Eisenhower. See, President Eisenhower’s
Farewell Address to the Nation, January 17, 1961.
3
Bailey, pp. 439-48.
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Europeans borrowed and innovated from Chinese science and used this for global
conquest that brought them bountiful colonial possessions.
Revolutionary China vs. Imperial China
Careful study of Mao Zedong’s writings and wisdom reveals the difference between
his sharp critical analysis and the spasmodic events that sprung up during his leadership
to overshadow the implications of his ideology. The Cultural Revolution (CR) and the
Great Leap Forward (GLP) were expressions of his critical thinking. They were
introduced as the operationalization of his theory and the synthesis that he constructed
to apply Marxism in China.
Theoretically, logically, and synthetically, the Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap
Forward were powerful inspirations capable of achieving great results. What was
missing was the lack of information for the effective implementation of public policy
methodologies and the development of technocratic skills similar to those of the Qin
and Han dynasties.
Some of early imperial China’s social and political features are rare in the histories
of early peoples: all political power was highly centralized; its government was a
bureaucracy of highly literate administrators who were men selected in principle
for their individual qualifications of learning and ability and its imperial
institutions. . . . the imperial state was a civil government, in which, nominally at
least, the civil virtues were held to be superior to the military (Mote, 2003, 3-4).
Chairman Mao believed that the Party is the macrocosm of the people. In his
estimation, the Party could multitask as a vanguard army, national service unit, and as
a bureaucratic civil service. What was needed was the institutional order that
differentiated professional skills and channeled them to work centers with clear
guidelines, clearer expectations, and accurate and precise measures of achieved results.
The Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap Forward lacked the systemization of the
means of production and marshalling of appropriate professional skills.
Further, Mao believed that the masses give wisdom, inspiration, and guidance, to the
correct path. He had confidence in the dedicated spirit of the masses and in their
willingness to unite behind the Party as long as the Party did not betray their confidence
and shortchange their expectations. He spoke of the dictatorship of the people as a
collective application of a regimented society marching to the orders of the Party.
When the Party sidetracked itself from policy formation, and engaged in aimless
ideological regimentation of the masses, it began simultaneously to forget the ancestral
wisdom, inspiration, and guidance that were embedded in the consciousness of the
masses, and it became a party dictatorship instead of a people’s dictatorship.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2019

5

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 80 [2019], No. 80, Art. 6

76

Number 80, Spring 2019

According to Mao’s analysis, a people’s dictatorship is legitimate; party dictatorship is
not, because it undermines the vision of the masses. When the Party shortchanges the
masses, Chairman Mao believed, the Republic will be confounded, and the Party will
have fallen short of the people’s expectations.
What constitutes the most remarkable and eye-opening realities of China today? It is
the fact that Maoism remains the guiding light of the Chinese Communist Party. Mao’s
doctrinal analysis envisioned post-1989 China and the CCP’s functional purposes. The
development and placement of differentiated skill, coordination of capital and policy
formations, and resources that were lacking during the Cultural Revolution and the
Great Leap Forward were met by the end of the twentieth century as the fulfillment of
Mao’s visions. The state and the Party were to merge in symbiotic relationship to
enhance the glow of a functional state.
Today’s China was predicted during the Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap
Forward. It found its bearing during the third quarter of the 20th century. In the 21st
century, it is at the initial phase of its maturity. Its capacity for capital formation, its
systemization of a vast work force, and its inherent abilities to maximize the efficiency
of its material resources suggest the prospect of surpassing the EU, the United States,
or Russia in global influence. The productive and useful expectation of the Cultural
Revolution and the bench-marks of the Great Leap Forward can be realized with
maximum effect in the Third World if China commits enough resources for its own
investment returns while uplifting the Third World from its dismal position today.
The closing decade of the 19th century China positioned itself to overcome the
intrusions of colonialism in China. The years between the First and Second World
Wars witnessed the birth pains of the modern China. Events such as the Boxer
Rebellion represented symbolic indicators of an indomitable spirit.
The First World War years contained painful episodes that rendered China, once a great
power, possessing a majestic civilization, reduced to a defensive posture; at times it
was barely capable of defending its sovereignty against colonial powers and Japanese
imperialism. The devastation continued during the Second World War. The 1940s
witnessed the maturity and the determination of the Communist Party under the
leadership of Chairman Mao Zedong. The Chinese Communist Party at this stage
showed a combative spirit and intense discipline.
The military and political organizations were on sure footing as of mid-century, able to
defeat the Nationalists and consolidate China’s sovereignty in the post-post World War
II decades. After the Second World War, China’s role was regional, mainly in Korea
and Taiwan/Formosa. After 1976, the making of an impending superpower with
inspiring history and tradition embedded in its old civilization started to become
evident.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol80/iss80/6
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Joseph Fewsmith describes China at this stage as “historically the most self-conscious
society in the world, and the legacy of its history and civilization continue to play an
important role, consciously and unconsciously, in the way that China is governed.”
When Mao Zedong, the leader of the Communist revolution, sought guidance on
governing his nation, he turned not to the works of Marx and Lenin, whose
philosophy he espoused, but to China’s dynastic histories to better understand the
way in which China’s emperors had ruled the nation. He did so even as he
excoriated China’s imperial past as feudal.4
Once the China Communist Party inaugurated the People’s Republic of China, the
Republic started, metaphorically, learning to walk, to steady its footing, and then to
take off on its journey at its current swift pace. Fewsmith’s analysis offers important
perspective as to the options available to leadership for guiding China along the path
of its past civilization. The challenge was of choosing liberal democracy or
communism; which best approximated Chinese tradition and civilization?
The Cold War: A Defining Era for China and the Third World
The end of the Second World War introduced new geopolitical alliances. The former
European colonies of Africa and Asia were liberated, and they joined the community
of nations as sovereign states. European powers had divided China into spheres of
European economic interests, but the country nevertheless escaped European
colonization. Furthermore, the civil war between the nationalists and the communists
preoccupied Chinese patriots.
In 1949, the communists under the leadership of Mao Zedong defeated the Nationalists
and established themselves as the rulers of China with the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA.) The communists defeated the Nationalist hope of instituting liberal democracy
in China. Ever since then, the Chinese Communist Party has become the undisputed
authority, assuming the role of modernizing China and creating a formidable deterrent
as well as offensive capabilities.
The Cold War years (1945-1991) were defining decades for China. In the first place,
the army participated in the Korean War. Even though its military and strategic
resources were far more limited than those of the Allied forces, the numerical size and
the discipline within the PLA’s hierarchy enabled China to extract a settlement
resulting in the division of Korea. At this time the Chinese State morphed in ways that
blended Mao’s theory of the people’s dictatorship and Party rule.

Fewsmith, J. “The Government of China”, In Michael Curtis, General Editor, Introduction to
Comparative Politics, Longman, Inc. New York, NY: 1997: 397.
4
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The symbiotic blend of the Chinese State and the Party reveals the seamless overlap
between the powers of the state and the party, and the ideological framework that
defined their unity. Imperial China captured by Maoist China gained a Chairman
without royalty and state power without the imperial crown. The cultural attributes that
molded the Chinese citizen, the makings of individual resiliency to endure interminable
hardships while extolling imperial China as one of the highest civilizations in the world
was replaced by the People’s Party’s “permanent revolution” (Britten, 1968).
The “permanent revolution” was the costly preoccupation of the Party to create
dreadful purges of its bureaucratic ranks and its cadres on the pretext and fear of an
incipient betrayal of the revolution and a default to bourgeoisie mentality.
Revolutionary China defined its rationale for ruling on the logical abstractions of
Chairman Mao’s teachings; the force of his personality seemed to overshadow his
ideological abstractions and sidetracked the Party and the State into running in circles
diverted away from the healing cultural values of the Chinese people.
The best way to look at this abstract elaboration is to think of the undisputed legitimacy
of the Chinese state, its living history, civilization, culture, and heritages, all so
dominant that modification and political analysis and attempts to provide an alternative
view and alternative institutions or ideas, such as communism or liberalism, continually
appear out of place.
China’s long-established identity has proven to be beyond ideological or practical
innovations, even those of Mao himself. Revolutionary China began to play a global
role during the Cold War. Stalin’s Russia began as an ally of China, but the friendship
dissolved fast, because of border friction and Stalin’s misperception of Mao.5 At first,
the two regimes were ideological friends, but for Stalin it was difficult to control his
contrarian ego. He refused to reciprocate the same respect and ideological comradeship
that he received from Mao. Soon, the two communist giants split.
During this time, China embarked on a tumultuous ideological journey. The Party
wanted to create a monolithic communal state and concentrate its energies on
collectivism without giving due consideration to those technocratic resources that were
needed to facilitate developmental strategies that are efficient, expedient and nondisruptive. Lack of technical and systemic planning caused food shortages. Cadres
who showed ideological inspiration without any technical skills and administrative
strategies were ordered to achieve the same levels of performance that would be
expected of trained and experienced technicians and scientists.

New York Times, “Stalin-Mao Alliance was Uneasy: Newly Released Papers Show”,
https://www.nytimes.com/1995/12/10/world/stalin-mao-alliance-was-uneasy-newly-released-papersshow.html
5
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This failure to harmonize ideological visions with the development of bureaucratic and
civil service professionals resulted in the failure of the Cultural Revolution and the
Great Leap Forward to serve as a useful template for the Third World to emulate.
Such setbacks were mitigated by the sense of national freedom and state sovereignty
of China and its citizens. China had become totally free from foreign domination. It
revealed its confidence by following a philosophy of self-reliance. Perhaps most
significant, Mao’s logic on capitalism appears to have predicted the present market
system of 21st century China.
On the one hand, he condemns capitalism as a tool of mass oppression by the capitalist
classes. He makes exception to this theory by allowing small-scale capitalist activity
within the rank of the middle classes such as artisans, shop owners, individual farmers.
He believed the CCP’s task was to eliminate the residues of capitalism in private hands
and totally transfer the apparatus of capitalism to the state.
Ultimately, the problem of such an expectation is prioritization.
The period that Mao envisioned for the eradication of capitalism in one sector of society
and its replacement with people’s socialism was not set in stone. Even if rigid
mobilization and discipline are enforced on the formation and implementation of public
projects with tightly scheduled policies, the effect is a form of chaotic misery and
needless catastrophes such as were seen in the Cultural Revolution and Great Leap
Forward. Mao’s real communism is the expression of a state capable of attaining the
legitimacy to represent all of the masses and bring the entire economy under its control
by emulating the accumulative habits and practices of capitalism.
The following statement reflects Mao Zedong’s idea of capitalism, at least at the time
when it was published in 1952:
The present-day capitalist economy in China is a capitalist economy which for the
most part is under the control of the People's Government and which is linked with
the state-owned socialist economy in various forms and supervised by the workers.
It is not an ordinary but a particular kind of capitalist economy, namely, a statecapitalist economy of a new type. It exists not chiefly to make profits for the
capitalists but to meet the needs of the people and the state.
True, a share of the profits produced by the workers goes to the capitalists, but that
is only a small part, about one quarter, of the total. The remaining three quarters
are produced for the workers (in the form of the welfare fund), for the state (in the
form of income tax) and for expanding productive capacity (a small part of which
produces profits for the capitalists).
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Therefore, this state-capitalist economy of a new type takes on a socialist character
to a very great extent and benefits the workers and the state.6

The above quote is the heart of Mao’s thinking, in the opinion of this author. It is what
Mao prophesied would take place in China when he penned it barely a decade after he
led his army to victory in the civil war. It was realized in the precise manner that he
prophesied during the years 1989 to today. China today is what Mao envisioned in his
revolutionary days.
China is relatively new to the status of a superpower actor, so comparing the way China
interacts with the Third World will offer a useful context for what is to come for the
poor states of Africa and Asia as they raise their hopes and expectations about China.
How will China make a difference in the economic, educational, health, and overall
societal welfare of the Third World? China under the leadership of Chairman Mao was
friendly and sympathetic to Third World countries.
Will the Chinese state fulfill Chairman Mao’s vision for the Third World today, in the
present century, as it has done with respect to the people of China?
The following statement shows Mao’s good will and the genuine solidarity that he
extended to the Third World as it struggled against colonialism and the forms of
economic dependency that he recognized.
Chairman Mao Zedong referred to the Chinese people as comrades of the former
colonized peoples of Africa and Asia. He called for a common bond to throw off
the burdens of poverty and destitution that came about due to Western exploitation
and greed.
It is also instructive to catalogue the types of material, cultural, scientific,
economic, and developmental experiences China can share with the Third World.
Mao Zedong's strategic thinking shed light on the fact that the two super-powers
were then the main source of instability and turmoil in the world. Their acts of
pursuing hegemonism, power politics — the big bullying the small, the strong
bullying the weak, and the rich oppressing the poor — that gave rise to strong
opposition and resentment by countries of the third world.
As a member of the third world, China firmly supported other third world countries
in their struggles against hegemonism and struggles waged by countries of the
second world against interference and control by the super-powers.
Selected Works of Mao Zedong: “On State Capitalism”, (Written comment on a document of the
National Conference on Financial and Economic Work held in the summer of 1953), July 9, 1953.
6
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China was firmly opposed to the policy of expansionism pursued by the superpowers and carried out the policy of uniting with and struggling against the United
States to strike at Soviet hegemonism, thus effectively restraining the expansionist
forces of the Soviet Union.7
The People’s Army was conditioned to tolerate the bitter revolutionary struggles that
brought the birth of the People’s Republic of China in 1949.
Mao organized a peasant army, the People’s Liberation Army, and created a strong
political organization, while the Chinese Communist Party indoctrinated cadres in
peasant-based guerrilla warfare, and confronted Chang Kai-shek’s nationalist army.
The PLA was an effective military force. It quickly matured and was superior in size,
discipline, and military strategy. It drove Chiang Kai-shek out of mainland China and
established a communist government in 1949. The CCP was Mao’s creation, organized
from the grassroots.
The Makings of a Powerful China
Revolutionary China embarked on its current journey in 1949 when the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) took power and inaugurated the People’s Republic. The new
communist state was on the experimental path to render Marxism as a practical guide
for political, economic, and social progress. Capitalism as a contending ideology to
Marxism was severely criticized by the newly mobilized communists when they
published their Communist Manifesto. They catalogued its harmful effects on the
working classes of the world. The toil of the industrial workers, the negative
capitalization of labor at far lower value compared to the goods produced by the
industrial laborers, and the exponential growth of capital accumulation without good
citizenship of industrialists offended Marx and Engels.
In the imagination of the revolutionary Marxists, such as Lenin, Trotsky, Mao and
Stalin, Marxism provided an equalitarian solution (Wolfe, B. 1948; Moore, B. 1966).
Marxism in its experimental phase began when the Bolsheviks launched the
Communist state of Russia in 1917. After Lenin’s death, Joseph Stalin took over and
led Russia through the difficulties of the Second World War. Stalin’s brand of
leadership exploited the centralizing and dictatorial versions the communist doctrine.
He was gifted in commanding attention, generating fear in the heart of his comrades
and followers. He was unbending in the execution of his agenda.

See” Chairman Mao Zedong’s Theory on the Division of the World and the Strategy of Forming
Alliance Against an Opponent, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18008.shtml.
7
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Stalin ignored the philosophical and analytical foundations of Communism as he relied
on his dictatorial instincts to run the Soviet State. His personality dominated the
institutional hierarchies of the Leninist Party. Mao resembled Stalin in his
interpretation of Marxism. He differed from Stalin, because Mao, belatedly, modified
Marxism by waking up to the ancient Chinse cultural wisdoms, The Yenan Way”, as
having ideals worth considering.8
In 1934, Mao and the PLA made their “The Long March” from southeastern China.
They settled in the Province of Yenan, an impoverished rural section in northwestern
China. They established Yenan as their revolutionary base from where Mao’s thoughts
and ideological philosophy evolved from hardcore Marxism, gradually distancing
themselves from the Soviet Model. Mao’s version of Marxism needed theoretical
modification. It is not the Russian version of communism that China needed, but one
inspired by the ancient soil and soul of China. He found those inspirations in rural and
traditional Yenan.
Mao's theoretical elaboration was incremental. It was an amalgam of his writings,
poems, theoretical analysis, and China’s folklore linked together by a thread of
revolutionary zeal. Both Mao and Stalin converged in the similarity of their party
control. Stalin was much older, but they were ideological contemporaries. They
differed in their ideological orthodoxy. Mao shared Stalin’s practices of mass
mobilization. The severity of Stalinist collectivization and villagization and Mao’s
Cultural Revolution and Great Leap Forward have identical outcomes on their
respective societies. The outcomes were traumatic and destructive.
The Yenan way reoriented Mao’s views into reconsidering the great merits of the
Chinese heritage. He embarked on integrative theory by taking into consideration
Chinese ancient history and the lives of great Chinese emperors. In practice and reality,
he was self-assured, confident of the soundness of his own theory. Additionally, the
outcome of his policy decisions attracted attention to his forceful personality.
The Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution were the climax of his way of
thinking, one that had evolved since the 1930s when he moved his base to Yenan. His
temperament and his personal idiosyncrasies compromised the soundness and the
objectivity of his theoretical thinking. His major decisions, such as the Cultural
Revolution and Great Leap Forward, bordered on irrationality.
The destruction and devastations they wrought and the pain they inflicted on the
longsuffering Chinese people did not make theoretical or common sense.

8

Selden, M. (1971). The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
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In discipline, combat preparation, and mobilization, Mao was an innovative trailblazer,
while always admiring and celebrating such ancient Chinese philosophies and
ideological inheritances as Confucianism. To elevate his revolutionary message, he
propagandized Maoism as a variant of Marxism rooted in the peasantry.
In Asia, the legacy of colonial policies with regard to border lines is being felt today
by China’s neighbors. The limits of China’s borders that had been drawn during
the colonial era and readjusted by Japan and the Great Powers after the Second
World War are now subject to China’s apparent intentions to redraw the limits of
its claims to the satisfaction of its newly regained self-assertion and grandeur.
China’s neighbors, namely Vietnam, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and
Cambodia are protesting China’s unilateral decision to redraw their borders and
contest their territorial waters.9 Similar problems persist in the Middle East, Africa,
and South America and in Eastern Europe (Isaac, T. 2015:15).
Maoism as a special version of communism modified to fit Mao’s conceptions was not
crystalized to approximate the ideals of Marxism, Leninism, or Maoism. The CCP
charted its own version of ideological, political, industrial and economic policies as the
basis for launching the robust modernization journey that China embarked on in 1989.
From 1946 to 1949, China experienced a civil war between the nationalist Chinese
under liberal Chiang Kai-shek and Mao’s Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
Chiang Kai-shek had started his own career as a communist. As he studied the
communists and understood their methods, he changed course to become a dedicated
liberal securing financial and military aid from the West, particularly the United States.
One of the first steps that he took after he changed his ideology was to fight to eliminate
the communists within his organization.
In 1927, Chang Kai-shek succeeded in defeating the communists. He severely crippled
and disrupted their organizational efforts, but a few fled to the rural areas under Mao’s
leadership. Chiang Kai-shek thus served as the preeminent leader of Mainland China
until 1949. In the civil war that culminated in 1949, Chiang Kai-shek and his National
Army were driven out of mainland China to create the Republic of China on Taiwan.
The People’s Liberation Army under the leadership of Mao Zedong declared the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949.

Wan, W. “China Wages a Quiet War of Maps with its Neighbors”, The Washington Post, electronic
edition, February 16, 2013.
9
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The Making of a Mercantilist and Powerful China
Following the death of Chairman Mao in 1976, the chaos and restlessness of the
revolutionary zeal was sorted out when a new group of leaders rose from the ranks of
the CCP and redirected China away from Maoism and toward state capitalism. China’s
state capitalism allowed small measures of private enterprise in commerce, IT
enterprises, real estate, and agriculture. Under the leadership of President Jiang Zemin,
in the early 1990s, a robust free market economy and entrepreneurial incentives were
encouraged. The upper echelon of the CCP controlled political power and, at the same
time, relaxed economic restrictions.
The Party woke up to realize that the Chinese genius for national renewal and
prosperity rested on the engine of private entrepreneurship, not as a result of ideological
sentiment but as an aspect of national character. As private capital was encouraged,
parts of the macroeconomics of China, including fiscal, monetary, foreign trade,
commerce, industrial, and policy matters were firmly under the grip and watchful eyes
of the CCP. The ideological party of the Mao years embraced the state as an
instrumental tool for mercantilism.
As a result, within the last 50 years, China has managed to stand tall as an economic
giant. Today, China’s economic tentacles span the globe. It uses its vast economic
surplus to stipulate its own dictates to achieve compound interest on the marginal
foreign aid it extends to the Third World. Will this dynamic accumulation differ from
the capitalist mode of economic interaction against which Chairman Mao used to rail?
The CCP certainly became adept at creating pragmatic and practical policy tools. At
the lower level of economic activities, the CCP allowed small businesses and single
input merchandising interests, such as consumable and perishable items, for its vast
consumer market. As Townsend stated:
Despite their sensitivity [to centralization] problems, Chinese elites apparently
remain committed to their pattern of diffused administrative responsibilities. It has
served as a check on bureaucratic expansionism, prepared the country for resistance
to foreign attack, and compiled a creditable record of economic growth.
Most significantly, perhaps, it has created an administrative system that is sensitive
to the growth potential of localities and encourages them to maximize the use of
their own resources. This aspect of decentralization, in combination with mass line
methods of work, supports political mobilization and community involvement
among the population.10

10

Townsend, J. R. Politics: China (1980). Little Brown and Company, Boston, MA: p.316.
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This practice encouraged large-scale capital accumulation, the spinoff of which was
the increase of government revenue. Never mind that regulatory policies were lax or
that the greed associated with feverish capitalism resulted in the reciprocal exchanges
of benefits between grasping entrepreneurs and corrupt party cadres. In the larger
scheme of Chairman Mao’s analysis of the “contradictions” associated with the
revolutionary landscape, the economic sector manifests profit-seeking elements who
will use their bureaucratic positions to align with entrepreneurs to impede the
revolutionary struggle.
He was specific about the endemic tendencies of profit-seeking pointing out: “To
maintain public order and safeguard the interests of the people, it is necessary to
exercise dictatorship as well over thieves, swindlers, murderers, arsonists, criminal
gangs and other scoundrels who seriously disrupt public order”.11
For midlevel production, distribution and labor relations, a version of a neo-corporatist
system blending state and corporate interests as instrumental policy for national
mobilization became the chosen path for harmonious means of economic production,
distribution, and extraction. Government revenue skyrocketed as Chinese goods
flooded global markets. Governance mattered in the larger scope of the CCP’s national
agenda.
Once the benefits of a guided free market started accumulating, the CCP encouraged
intense capital accumulation. Its capacity for capital formation, for mobilizing the
workforce, identifying work centers, segmenting the workforce via work centers, and
identifying policy targets from the actual planning strategies was combined with the
force of its ability to inspire society for most productive activities. State autarchy was
unleashed and Chinse entrepreneurs, scientists, engineers all contributed to the rise of
a triumphant, increasingly wealthy state.
Mao was always optimistic about China’s potentials. His use of the concept of
“empiricism” to affirm his conviction of China’s stratospheric rise was looked at
askance by those who subjected his work to strict analysis. 12 He based his hopeful
optimism of China’s rise to prominence on purely Marxist logic. His “thoughts”,
strategies, and polemics were Marxist, but it is also apparent that he channeled
Confucianism, the values of which he was jealously proud.
After 1989, a new outlook and new ideas were elevated as ideological guides to be
embraced by an enlightened state and Party for the achievement of national prosperity.

11

Mao Tse Tung (1960). On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People. Peking,
Foreign Languages Press, 1957: 12.
12
Kraus, R. C., “The Limits of Maoist Egalitarianism,” Asian Survey, Vol. 16, No. 11 (November
1976), pp. 1084-1086

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2019

15

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 80 [2019], No. 80, Art. 6

86

Number 80, Spring 2019

China has rediscovered Mao’s philosophical thoughts and reconciled them with those
ancient Chinese cultural goals that he tried but could not accomplish due to his largerthan life image of himself in comparative terms. He was egotistic, self-assured,
brilliant in thoughts, thoughtless in actions, and unwilling to look back and take
corrective measures to correct or admit his failures. The succeeding leadership bettered
him in being rational, astute, wise, duty-bound, cautious, but prodding and taking risks
in global affairs.
The blend of ideology and culture are elevating the citizen as an engine of creative
ideas, boundless efforts, and a committed vanguard for a modernized and industrialized
China. Today, China is rising, and its bright future can shed rays of hope to Third
World Countries. The extent to which the Third World is going to fare better by
emulating the China model compared to the developmental model that was offered by
the liberal ideology is a legitimate topic of study.
China and the Third World Today
China has reignited its ancient culture of phenomenal creativity in growing areas of
science, the economy, Internet Technology, and globalization.13 It has climbed up the
ladder of the take-off stage and reached the economic heights, thus inching closer to
the developed stage. As it does so, its approach to development is a zero-sum game.
China is now viewed as lacking a sense of restraint in its exploitative relations to the
Third World.
China has evolved into a country that is accumulative and exploitative — in the process,
it has become far worse than the liberal capitalists whom Chairman Mao described as
“blood suckers.”
One former government official whose country was taken advantage of by the Chinese
International Development Bank lamented:
Venezuela has tried to finance itself with the help of the China Development Bank,
which does not impose the kind of conditionality that IMF bashers dislike. Instead,
the CDB lends on secret terms, for uses that are undisclosed and corrupt, and with
built-in privileges for Chinese companies in areas like telecommunications
(Huawei), appliances (Haier), cars (Chery), and oil drilling (ICTV).

Financial Times, January 2015, “Chinese GDP Growth Lowest in 24 Years”,
https://wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/summer-2014-1989-and-the-making-of-our-modernworld/chinas-1989-choice-paradox-seeking-wealth-and-democracy/; See also
https://www.ft.com/content/760621a8-9fcf-11e4-aa89-00144feab7de.
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The Chinese have not required that Venezuela do anything to increase the
likelihood it regains creditworthiness. They merely demand more oil as collateral.
Whatever the IMF’s faults, the CDB is a disgrace.14
China has earned the right to be regarded as a fully developed country. Its level of
modernization, both in the economic and the political arenas, is as robust as those states
who categorized China as a developing state less than 50 years ago.
China’s lightening economic development is spectacular, and the scale of
differentiation is vast in all categories of the sciences. China’s civil engineering feats
are creating islands out of the deep-sea oceans. China’s strategic and defense
developments are manned by the most sophisticated scientific skills under the
command of phalanxes of young scientists whose creativity, vision, dedication, and
Confucian discipline are awe-inspiring.15 Simultaneously, China is accelerating its
scientific speed with determined confidence to catch up with the West, and with the
United States, in particular.16
With the outbreak of the Cold War shortly after 1945, China was at a crossroads. Was
the Peoples Liberation Army to clench the revolutionary banner and launch China on a
radical revolutionary path or were the Nationalists going to prevail?
Until Chairman Mao Zedong’s death in 1976, China was a vanguard leader of the Third
World. As such, it provided to the Third World countries an ideological vision of
egalitarian Marxism. However, the stridency of Maoism, the asymmetry of its
ideological vision, and the tactical errors committed in the selection of public policy
tools essential for the smooth implementation of the Great Leap forward, all attracted
negative attention.
The drama overshadowed the substantive contents and ideological intent of the Great
Leap Forward. For this reason, the “brotherhood” and the common vision that China
saw as the basis for cementing a strong bond with the Third World were not
consummated. The mechanical aspect of the Cultural Revolution also dissipated
popular energy as different social forces within the CCP battled each other while the
masses meekly fulfilled the Party’s objectives in terms of production goals.

Hausman, R. (2015), quoted in David Dollar, “China Investment in Latin America, The Brooking
Institute Governance and Global Issues, Paper 4, January 2017: page 9. Also,
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/fp_201701_china_investment_lat_am.pdf
15
Cong Cao. China’s New Scientific Elite: Routledge Curzon, Taylor and Francis Group, London, UK:
2004:35-48).
16
“Nine Ways Chinese Scientists are Pushing the Envelope in 2017”,
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/society, Viewed 26May2018.
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The organizational crisis within the Party was used by capitalists and imperialists to
paint a negative picture of Maoism. Third World countries were warned to distance
themselves from Maoism. President Kennedy’s warning “Those who ride on the back
of the tiger will end up inside” was frequently cited and was meant to sway the
geopolitical preferences of the Third World.
Still many Third World revolutionaries remained loyal comrades of China and admired
the CCP’s ability to rule effectively. Third World revolutionaries such as Kwame
Nkrumah of Ghana, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia,
Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, and Mohammed Mossadegh of Iran were all dedicated
centralists whose ideological vision was similar to that of Maoism.
The ideological objectives and goals where China and Third World revolutionaries
agreed included, in this author’s view:
1. Equalitarian Marxism envisioned a strong centralizing developmental state.
2. The centralizing developmental state is ultimately dedicated to faithfully
striving for the realization of human rights, civil liberties, due process of law
and justice.
3. In order to achieve these ultimate objectives, the party must be disciplined and
trained in the art of selfless revolutionary thought. The rank and file members
must be valiant, relentless, loyal and conversant in Marxist analysis.
4. The state was to be governed by the rules and edicts of a centralized and
dominant party.
5. The party would rely on using authoritarian methods to realize totalitarian
governance without deviating from its mission to build a prosperous, peaceful,
and secure society.
6. Totalitarianism is a unitary system where social harmony is enforced,
individualism is subordinated to the collective objectives and goals, and
individual choices are curtailed for maximizing harmonious political and social
order.
Countries differed in their methodology of application and in the challenges they faced
to fully implement their policy goals. Nearly all of the above-cited revolutionary
leaders were confronted by foreign and domestic resistance. Those who overcome
foreign resistance were exceptions, such as Nyerere. Only China stands today fulfilling
the Maoist version of Marxism.
The warm embrace of the Third World by Mao is still enunciated by the leadership of
China. There is obvious goodwill from China and the huge investment that China is
making in the Third World is worthy of praise. As stated above, an ideological stand
without the technical support of an effective public administration and public policy
can fail and thus make heavy investment in the Third World meaningless.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol80/iss80/6
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Patterns of China’s foreign aid programs seem designed to give mixed results of
promise and disappointing failure. The areas where China’s foreign investment and
foreign aid is making progress are seen in those countries that have established a
committed civil service sector. Thus, in countries such as Ethiopia where, in relative
terms, cultural habits repudiate corruption, China’s investment was fruitful. Those that
are failing are mostly in Africa where the civil service sector is fraught with corruption
and inefficiencies.
China’s interaction with the Third World is dynamic; it is evolving and changing. An
example of this is China is rethinking of its investments with corrupt and ineffective
governments. What positive returns will China’s investment bring can only be
measured over an extended period of time. The pitfalls that impaired the effectiveness
of the Cultural Revolution and Great Leap Forward can also be challenges to
developmental cooperation. Skilled manpower, high ethical standards, transparency,
and, most of all, proven benefits that lift the lives of neglected societies must animate
China’s role in the Third World in order to make a difference. These are what China
wishes for its citizens and should be what China’s investment abroad may show to the
world in general and to the Third World in particular.
Conclusion
China stands self-assured, proud of its civilization and history. Its manpower and the
Chinese spirit and culture that animated its genius constitute an enviable resource that
many countries admire. Beyond that, as modern China expands its global influence to
distant lands, its mining and resource extraction ventures can easily turn to
misadventures if China neglects its obligation to profile ethical and honest exchange
with Third World interlocutors.
If China is aiming to help the Third World in ways that are better than those options
that were provided by the West, its motivation should be based on reciprocal benefits,
not on ways that compound the Third World’s economic impoverishment. Among
these options are:
1. China should reciprocate the generosity, trust, and high expectations that Third
World’s citizens have placed on China’s partnership as better alternatives in the
broad areas of the economy, diplomatic, and civilization.
2. Direct investment by capitalists, and what Chairman Mao called “their running
dogs,” was criticized by Chairman Mao, and by scholars from the dependency
theory field of study as form of neo-colonialism. China’s direct investment
must provide socio-economic benefits to its Third World partners enough to
elevate their poverty-stricken lives and to heal their wounded pride.
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3. China’s interaction and economic exchanges with the Third World are criticized
as being mechanical, one-sided and brutally exploitative. Critics argue that
China is interested only in what China can get by way of hoarding extracted
goods and industrial input and leaving Third World in worse situations. China
must work hard to dispel this criticism by aiming to better the lives of those
societies with whom China interacts in care, consciousness, and altruism similar
to its aims for its own citizens at home.

China has earned the right to be regarded as a fully developed country. Its level of
modernization, both in economic and political areas, is as robust as those states which
relegated China to developing status just recently. China’s lightening economic
development is spectacular, and the scale of differentiation is vast in all categories of
the sciences. China’s civil engineering feats are creating islands out of the deep-sea
oceans.
China’s strategic and defense developments are manned by the most sophisticated
scientific skills, under the command of phalanxes of young scientists whose creativity,
vision, dedication, and Confucian discipline are awe-inspiring.17 Scholars observe than
China is accelerating its scientific speed with determined confidence to catch up with
the West and the United States.18
Some look at China’s march forward as technical achievement and accumulation of
wealth. They measure China’s achievements by what is quantifiable. Such
quantifiable results cannot be disputed. However, there are normative elements in the
study of nations that are as effective as quantitative results. These include national
character, history, institutional accountability, and the harmonization of such
amorphous characteristics as ideological beliefs and the strict parameters of public
policy goals and objectives. The country that succeeds in the harmonization and in the
precision of these vectors will rule.

Gao, Ch ( 2018), “This War Turned China into a Super Power”, National Interest, January 2018:
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